Missouri Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 2 Spring 1979

Article 10

Spring 1979

Sentencer Must Have Some Discretion in Imposing Capital
Punishment: Another Retreat from Furman v. Georgia--Lockett v.
Ohio
Marcus C. McCarty

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marcus C. McCarty, Sentencer Must Have Some Discretion in Imposing Capital Punishment: Another
Retreat from Furman v. Georgia--Lockett v. Ohio , 44 MO. L. REV. (1979)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

McCarty: McCarty: Sentencer Must Have Some Discretion in Imposing Capital Punishment:
RECENT CASES

1979]

Certain problems remain, of course, under the Diversfied test. For example, Judge Henley in his dissent accepts generally the new test, but he
raises the question of its applicability to communications by employees of
44
corporations that are subsidiaries or affiliates of the corporate client.
There is also the question of the applicability of the test in a shareholder's
by employees who have dealt
derivative suit involving communications
45
adversely to the corporate client.
Despite these unresolved problems, the Diversified test, by adding
substantial anti-abuse safeguards to the Harper&Row requirements, may
turn out to be an attractive alternative to the heavily criticized control
group test. It may also be of guidance to Missouri courts as they face
renewed attorney-client privilege questions following the implementation
4
of the state's new analog to the federal work product rule. 6
MILTON B. GARBER

SENTENCER MUST HAVE SOME
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: ANOTHER RETREAT
FROM Furman v. Georgia
Lockett v. Ohio'
Sandra Lockett was charged with aggravated murder for her part in a
homicide which occurred during an armed robbery in an Akron, Ohio,
pawn shop. At trial the State established that Lockett, Nathan Dew, and
Al Parker had conspired to commit an armed robbery in the neighborhood
pawn shop. Testimony indicated that according to a plan Lockett was to
2
keep watch outside the shop during the holdup and drive the getaway car.
Witnesses at trial testified that the conspirators had not planned to kill the
pawn shop owner during the robbery. 3 However, during the holdup the
shop owner was accidentally shot and killed when he grabbed for Al
44.

572 F.2d at 613.

45. Id. See also Chief Judge Gibson's separate opinion stating "few would
question the propriety of a shareholder's investigating whether the corporation or
its agents have engaged in unlawful conduct." Id. at 616.
46. See note 11 supra.
1. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978). See also Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct.
2977 (1978) (overturned petitioner's death sentence on the basis of decision in
Lockett).
(1978). 1979
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Parker's gun.4 Lockett, against the advice of counsel, refused to take the
stand in her defense and was unable to produce any evidence at trial. In
opening statement, Lockett's attorney insisted that his client had no
knowledge of the robbery plan. He maintained that Lockett thought
Parker was merely going to pawn a ring.6
The jury found Lockett to be guilty as charged. 6 The trial judge, pursuant to Ohio law, was required to sentence Lockett to death if, after hearing additional evidence and considering the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history, character and condition of the defendant, he
failed to find the existence of one of three statutory mitigating factors. 7
The trial judge did not find any of the mitigating factors present in
Lockett's case and she was sentenced to die. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari9 and, with eight
justices participating,10 reversed the Ohio Supreme Court and declared
the Ohio capital punishment statute unconstitutional."1 A plurality con4. Id.
5. Id. at 2958.
6. Although murder, in Ohio, generally requires the defendant to have a
purposeful mental state, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page Repl. Vol.
1975), the Ohio definition of purpose states that "when the gist of the offense is a
prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender
intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of
that nature." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (Page Repl. Vol. 1975). In the
case at bar the mens rea was established through felony murder theory and the act
was imputed through the Ohio conspiracy statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.03 (Page Repl. Vol. 1975). Thus it was unnecessary for the State to prove
that any of the participants in the conspiracy actually intended to kill the shop
owner.
In Ohio aggravated murder was punishable by death provided the trier of
fact found that one or more of the statutory aggravating specifications was present. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-04 (Page Repl. Vol. 1975). The jury
determined the third and seventh aggravating circumstances were present. They
are: (3) the offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03-.04 (Page Repl. Vol. 1975) (statutory 'mitigating circumstances are: "(1) The victim of the offense induced or
facilitated it. (2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but
for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental
deficiency though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.").
8. State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), reversed,
98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978).
9. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1978).
10. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision.
11. The plurality also considered and specifically rejected other grounds for
appeal. (1) Lockett claimed that the prosecution's repeated references to the fact
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10
that the State's evidence was "uncontradicted" constituted a comment on peti-
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sisting of Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, Justice Powell and Justice
Stevens, held that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional because it did not
require the sentencing authority to consider all evidence relating to the
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that would mitigate against the imposition of death.' 2 In a separate
opinion, Justice White indicated that the imposition of death upon a
defendant who lacked the specific intent to kill his victim was grossly
disproportionate and therefore was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment. 13
It is highly questionable whether the plurality's opinion in Lockett can
be reconciled with the Court's prior pronouncements in the capital punishment area. The plurality's logic suggests that much of the reasoning of
prior capital punishment cases is no longer accepted. The proportionality
argument of Justice White proposes an alternative method of determining
the constitutionality of the death sentence. Whatever effect Lockett finally
has on the future of capital punishment, it clearly raises many new constitutional issues in this confused area of the law. As Chief Justice Burger
noted in his opinion, few problems in the law have encompassed so much
4
of the Court's time with as little resolution as capital punishment. 1
The watershed case in this area is Furmanv. Georgia,15 but the nine
separate concurring and dissenting opinions, when analyzed in their
totality, held only that it was sometimes unconstitutional to punish a
defendant with death.1 6 Four years later, in 1976, the Court decided a
tioner's failure to testify, and thus violated her fourth and fifth amendment rights
per Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954,
2960 (1978). (2) Lockett argued that the exclusion of jurors in voir dire on the
grounds of their refusal to commit themselves to deciding the guilt or innocence
on the basis of the facts presented because of the possibility that defendant could
be sentenced to death, deprived her of the right to a trial by jury. Lockett v. Ohio,
98 S. Ct. 2954, 2660-61 (1978). (3) Lockett claimed that the Ohio statute was so
complicated, with respect to the mens rea requirement for murder, that it deprived her of "fair warning" of the crime with which she was charged. Lockett v.
Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2961 (1978).
In a separate opinion justice Blackmun based his opinion favoring reversal, at
least in part, upon a violation of sixth amendment rights. Blackmun notes that a
plea of no contest or guilty would have allowed the sentencing court "full discretion" in considering whether or not the death penalty was warranted. Because she
went to trial, Lockett was barred from receiving certain sentencing considerations she would have enjoyed if she had pleaded guilty. "This disparity... under
the two sentencing alternatives" warranted reversal in Blackmun's opinion.
Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2971-72 (1978).
12. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978).
13. Id. at 2983 (White, J., concurring in the judgment and part of the opinion, but dissenting in part.).
14. Id. at 2963.
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2962 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285-86 (1972) (opinion of Brennan, J.; death
penalty always unconstitutional); id. at 358 (opinion of Marshall, J.; death penalPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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series of cases involving state statutes which attempted to reconcile state
law with Furman. Some state legislatures interpreted Furman to require
the total elimination of discretion in the capital punishment sentencing
process. Thus they instituted mandatory execution for certain crimes. 7
This interpretation was specifically disapproved in Woodson v. North
Carolina8 andRobertsv. Louisiana19 when the Court declared mandatory
death penalty statutes unconstitutional. The second group of cases involved statutes of Florida, Georgia and Texas which attempted to eliminate arbitrary and capricious sentencing determinations in capital cases by introducing various procedural safeguards. In these three cases, the Court
upheld the statutes. 20 The statutes upheld were not identical, especially in
terms of the factors the sentencer could consider in determining the propriety of imposing death in a given case. In order to return a death
sentence in Florida and Georgia the jury was required to find at least one of
the statutory aggravating circumstances in existence beyond a reasonable
doubt. The existence of one of the factors did not, however, dictate the imposition of the death penalty. Proffitt v. Floridaindicated that the Court
recognized a state's right to limit what a sentencer could consider in
mitigation of the death penalty. 21 However, in Gregg v. Georgia andJurek
ty always unconstitutional); id. at 257 (opinion of Douglas, J.; mandatory death
penalty might be constitutional for very specific criminal conduct); id. at 310
(opinion of Stewart, J.; procedural guidelines in sentencing might permit constitutional capital punishment).
17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.30, 14.42, 14.44, 14.113 (West 1974) (made
death mandatory for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, treason, and
special classes of murder); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (made
death sentence mandatory in all murders "perpetrated by means of poison, lying
in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture or premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or any other felony.").
18. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
19. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
20. Proffitt v. Flordia, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West Cum. Supp. 1977) (the Florida statute contained a list of eight aggravating
circumstances which had to outweigh seven mitigating factors before the death
sentence could be imposed); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1977) (Georgia code required sentencer to consider "any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law" and ten statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one of which had to be found to exist by the sentencing
authority in order to return a death sentence); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. §
37.07 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977) (Texas statute required jury to decide whether
there was "a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Further the jury
was instructed to determine whether the defendant deliberately caused the victim's death and that the defendant reacted unreasonably to the victim's provocation, if any existed.).
21. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1976). The validity of this proposition has been dramatically limited by the plurality's opinion in Lockett. See
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10
text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
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v. Texas, the Court suggested that it interpreted the statutes in Georgia
and Texas to allow the sentencing authority at least some consideration of
22
the defendant's past criminal record or age in mitigation of sentence.
Therefore, in the 1976 decisions the Court overtly overruled the use of
mandatory sentencing processes in which the sentencer had no discretion;
yet the plurality opinions were nebulous in regard to the nature and scope
of the factors which the judge or jury must be permitted to consider in
determining whether death is proper for a particular defendant.
In Coker v. Georgia,23 decided in the 1977 term, a plurality of the
Court adopted a different route of attack to invalidate the death penalty
for the crime of rape. Procedurally, the Georgia statute was identical to
the one upheld in Gregg.24 However, Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun
and Stevens were of the opinion that the punishment of death was unconstitutional for the crime of rape regardless of the procedure used in the
sentencing process. The conclusion was based on the assumption that the
death sentence was excessive because it made "no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment" or was "grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime." 25 The plurality indicated that either of these
grounds was sufficient to maintain a finding that the law was unconstitutional. The Court noted that rape was not punishable by death in any
other jurisdiction. The justices also found the severity of the punishment
for rape was disproportionate to the penalty for similar serious offenses in
Georgia. 26 These factors led the Court to the conclusion that death for the
crime of rape was unconstitutional. The Court in overruling the death
penalty sentence in Coker adopted other possible arguments, in addition
to the procedural considerations in the 1976 decisions, which could be
asserted against the imposition of death in any case.
The cases preceding the Lockett decision established three criteria
which a death penalty statute should satisfy in order to be consitutional.
First, the imposition of death could not be mandatory. 27 Second, the
capital punishment statute needed certain procedural safeguards to insure
a determination would not be made in an arbitrary or capricious
manner. 28 Finally, inflicting the death penalty had to make a measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. The sentence could never
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. 29
Sandra Lockett attacked her conviction arguing the Ohio statute was
deficient in the second and third criteria. She asserted that the Ohio
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 272-73 (1976).
23. 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
24. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2302, 27-2534.1 (1977).
25. Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2865 (1977).
26. Id. at 2866-68.
27. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
28. See note 20 supra.
Published29.
by University
Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
See noteof 23
supra.
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sentencing procedure was constitutionally defective and that the death
sentence was grossly disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional for
the crime she committed. The four member plurality opinion chose to
overturn the conviction by accepting the argument that Ohio's sentencing
procedure, like those in North Carolina" and Louisiana, 31 was constitutionally defective. The plurality held that by not permitting the sentencing
authority the opportunity to consider any aspect of the defendant's
character or record, or any of the circumstances of the offense, the Ohio
statute subjects the defendant to the same type of risks of arbitrary and
capricious decisions as the mandatory death penalty statutes.
The plurality intimates at the outset of its decision that its opinion is
merely a clarification of the Court's past holdings32 and not a radical innovation. The opinion begins by considering the "long line" of Supreme
Court opinions upholding the constitutionality of the exercise of discretion
on the part of the sentencing authority. 3 The most recent opinion which
involved sentencing discretion in capital punishment cases and which
commanded a majority of the Court held that jury discretion did not
violate a defendant's fourteenth amendment rights.3 4 The plurality in
Lockett asserted that Furman did not hold, as some states believed, that all
sentencing discretion must be eliminated. This contention was effectively
dismissed in the five 1976 cases which held that discretion on the part of
the sentencing authority should be directed and limited to insure that the
35
death penalty would not be inflicted arbitrarily.
From the premise that nothing in Furman or the Court's other decisions barred the sentencer from discretion in considering factors in mitigation of the death sentence, the plurality holds that in all but the rarest
cases the denial of consideration of all evidence relating to the character
and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense violates
the Constitution.3 6 Influenced by the fact that sentencing authorities are
30. See note 17 supra.
31. See note 17 supra.
32. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2963 (1978).
33. The "long line" consisted of the following three cases: Williams v.
Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959) (held not unconstitutional to consider a resultant
murder, in aggravation of a kidnapping conviction, even though the defendant
had already been tried, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder.);
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (allowed judge to impose death penalty based on information relating to the defendant's sexual conduct and other
alleged crimes not disclosed at trial or during the sentencing proceedings.); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) (statute allowing a defendant, convicted of escape from prison, to be punished with a sentence not exceeding the original sentence by virtue of which the defendant originally had
been imprisoned.).
34. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971).
35. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2963 (1978).
36. Id. at 2965. The plurality's caveat: "in all but the rarest kind of capital
case," which prefaces the new test, indicates that at least one of the Justices,
presumably Justice Burger, is not willing to abandon the concept of mandatory
death sentences for certain isolated crimes. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10
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granted discretion in almost all other offenses, the plurality concludes that
the denial of this consideration when the death sentence is at issue imposes
a "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
37
call for a less severe penalty."
Notwithstanding the plurality's contention to the contrary, the broad
constitutional endorsement of sentencing discretion is contrary to the principles of Furman. By the plurality's own admission, Furmanrequired an
end to arbitrary and capricious determinations by the sentencing authority seeking to impose the death sentence.3 8 But now, under the rule that
Lockett propounds, the absence of any checks on the jury's power to refuse
to impose death, simply because it chooses to consider a mitigating circumstance in one case and refuses to do so in another, clearly allows the
jury more opportunity to be arbitrary.3 9 Admittedly this possibility has
been present since the 1976 decisions disallowing the use of mandatory
death sentence statutes. However, the elevation of this discretion to the
level of a constitutional imperative, as Justice Rehnquist concludes, tends
40
to codify the very arbitrary factors Furman sought to eliminate.
Rather than illuminating the rationale of past decisions, the plurality's
solution further blurs the circumstances under which the death penalty
may be imposed. The test introduces yet another ground for reversal of a
defendant's death sentence. Each state court will now have to determine
whether the evidence offered by the defendant in mitigation of the death
penalty has any bearing on the character or prior record of the defendant
37. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978).
38. Id. at 2963.
39. Id. at 2973-75 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting), 2982 (White,
J., dissenting and concurring in the judgment).
40. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2975 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
No sentencing system can provide a foolproof check against unbridled jury discretion. The mandatory sentencing procedures, overruled by the Court in the 1976
decisions sought to alleviate the problem of arbitrariness by eliminating any
discretionary options for the sentencing authority in fixing punishment upon the
defendant. The Ohio statute, overruled in Lockett, sought to define the aspects a
jury could permissibly consider to three narrow factors. See note 7 supra. The obvious effect of the statute was to limit the sentencing authority to a rather narrow
list of criteria in determining the propriety of death in a given instance. Such an
approach does tend to have its advantages, especially in terms of facilitating the
review of the propriety of the sentence on appeal. The criteria on which the
sentencing authority is to base its decision is specifically listed.
Under the test which Lockett propounds, the factors which the sentencing
authority is required to consider are much broader. Almost any aspect of the
defendant's demeanor could be considered as a factor mitigating the defendant's
sentence. The dissent's fear is that the lack of specificity will encourage the jury or
trial judge to base the sentencing decision on improper factors, such as the defendant's race, thus restoring arbitrariness to the sentencing process. The dissent is
also concerned that the broad discretionary criteria allowed by the plurality's test
Published
by University
of Missouri
of Law review
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Repository,
1979Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S.
will make
it impossible
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or the circumstances of the offense. 4' Each exclusion of evidence will
potentially be grounds for appeal and reversal.
At least one member of the Court disagrees with the plurality's new
test; Justice White would not expand on the Court's previous attempts to
end arbitrary determinations in death penalty sentencing. 42 He considers
the reasoning of Coker, a rape case, also appropriate to felony murder
cases.4 3 Instead of overturning the Ohio statute on the grounds that it was
procedurally defective, Justice White accepts the proportionality test, concluding that the death sentence can serve no useful deterrent value when
44
the defendant lacks the specific intent to kill his victim.
White's conclusion is based in part on empirical data tending to show
the infrequency of death sentences when a defendant did not intend to
kill. Justice White contends that because this data shows that capital
punishment is rarely inflicted, it demonstrates society's aversion to this
severe punishment and cripples any deterrent value the sentence might
have.4 5 He acknowledges that approximately half the state legislatures
have not foreclosed the possibility of imposing death in these cases, but he
argues that sentencing authorities have by an overwhelming majority
46
refused to employ this punishment even when the option is available.
Justice White asserts that the time has come to foreclose the possibility entirely by making it unconstitutional.
This proportionality test, while not endorsed by the plurality, was
neither specifically rejected.4 7 In Lockett, only Justice Blackmun raised
any serious objections to the argument of Justice White.4 8 Moreover,
Justice Marshall has relied on the proportionality test to find capital

41. See note 12 supra for a discussion of other grounds for appeal of
Lockett's conviction; see also text accompanying notes 17-19 & 25-29 supra for
grounds used in other cases.
The problem is further compounded by the plurality's caveat (see note 36
supra). The prosecutor will undoubtedly argue that this was one of those "rarest
kind[s] of capital case[s]" and therefore the sentencer should not be required to
hear or consider certain evidence offered in mitigation of punishment.
42. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2983 (1978).
43. Id. at 2983.
44. Id. at 2984.
45. Id. at 2983-84.
46. Id. at 2983.
47. Id. at 2967 n.16.
48. Id. at 2969 n.2. Justice Blackmun's opinion questions the conclusions
drawn from the data whichJustice White relied on to show the death penalty is no
longer imposed on murderers who lack the specific intent to kill. As Justice
Blackmun notes, the evidence offered merely demonstrates that of 363 reported
exccution cases in the last 22 years, 347 were cases in which the defendant actually
killed his victim. The data does not address the issue of specific intent. Moreover,
Justice Blackmun questions the wisdom of imposing "an elaborate 'conhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10
stitutinalized' definition of the requisite mens rea, involving myriad problems of
line-drawing that normally are left to jury discretion."
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punishment unconstitutional in all cases. 49 The specific intent argument
then was by no means dealt a death blow in the Lockett opinion, and it is
still a viable argument for defendants when the facts are appropriate.
Missouri courts must now interpret and attempt to evaluate the implications of the Lockett decision upon Missouri law.50 The drafters of the
Missouri death penalty statutes have apparently borrowed procedure from
both the Georgia and Florida examples.5" However, Missouri law differs
from both the Florida and Georgia statutes in that in Missouri the imposition of death is only proper in cases where the defendant "unlawfully,
willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation kills or causes
the killing of another human being."5 2 The possibility that the death
sentence could be imposed through the felony murder doctrine is foreclosed. 53 Missouri has adopted by statute the result that would be reached
judicially with Justice White's proportionality argument: the death penalty cannot be imposed where the defendant lacked the specific intent to kill
his victim.
Unfortunately, the impact of the plurality argument on Missouri law is
not so clear. Missouri courts will be faced with some difficult questions as
to the admissibility of evidence offered in mitigation of the death sentence.
In terms of guidance in individual cases, the Court offers the trial judge little beyond its wide holding allowing the defendant to present, and the jury
to consider, all evidence pertaining to the defendant's character or record
54
and the circumstances of the offense.
Certainly, as the plurality noted, the traditional rules of evidence
would still apply as to relevancy; 55 the relevance of any evidence is depen49.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330-333 (1972) (Marshall, J., concur-

ring).
50. V.A.M.S. §§ 565.001, 565.006, 565.008, 565.012, 565.014 (Supp.
1978). The statute was originally passed in May 1977, after the mandatory death
penalty statute was declared unconstitutional in State v. Duren, 547 S.W.2d 476
(Mo. En Banc 1977). It was not revised by the 1979 Missouri Criminal Code.
51. Id. § 565.006 (this section, like both the Florida and Georgia statutes,
provides for a separate sentencing proceeding after a guilty verdict has been
returned). See GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2503 (1977); V.A.M.S. § 565.012 (Supp.

1978) (unlike the Georgia system, Missouri lists both aggravating and mitigating
factors for the jury to consider; like the Florida system, Missouri instructs the jury
to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether
death is proper in a given case; CompareFLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Gum.
Supp. 1977); V.A.M.S. § 565.012 (Supp. 1978); with Mo. APPROVED INSTR.
GRIM. No. 15.44 (1978 ed.).
52. V.A.M.S. § 565.001 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
53. The felony murder doctrine allows a defendant to be convicted of
murder for a homicide committed while the defendant was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate one of the statutory designated felonies. State v. Devoe,
430 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Mo. 1968). Felony murder is now defined as first degree
murder and is punishable by life in prison. See V.A.M.S. § 565.008 (Supp. 1978);
see also State v. Marston, 479 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1972); MO. APPROVED INSTR.
GRIM. Nos. 15.02, 15.04 (1978 ed.) for a concise interpretation of capital murder.
Published by
of Missouri
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Repository,
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dent on what factors the law will allow the court to consider in making a
determination.5 6 The Ohio statute allowed the defendant to introduce
evidence of and the sentencer to consider "the nature and circumstances of
57
the offense and the history, character, and condition of the offender."
The defect of the Ohio statute was not that it refused to allow the defendant to present his mitigating evidence; the problem was that it attempted
to limit the purpose for which the evidence could be considered by restricting the consideration of the evidence to the three statutory mitigating factors."
The inescapable conclusion is that Lockett prohibits the state
legislature from setting up any type of absolutely exclusive list of
mitigating factors which the defendant must prove. This is not to say that
any statute which contains a list of statutory mitigating circumstances is
unconstitutional per se. Such a list was contained in the Florida law the
Court endorsed less than two years ago in Proffitt.5 9 The plurality clearly
indicates that a judicial gloss permitting the defendant to introduce and
the sentencer to consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense would save a statute which on
60
its face appeared to violate the constitutional test Lockett imposes.
However, a statute which gives an exclusive list of circumstances which can
61
be used in mitigation of the death sentence is unconstitutional.
The Missouri statute requires the sentencer to hear "evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment."6 2 Further, the
sentencing authority is required to "weigh" seven specific statutory
mitigating circumstances, and mitigating circumstances otherwise
authorized by law, against ten aggravating circumstances in order to
determine whether death is warranted.6 3 At first the Missouri statute
56. Lockett did not deal with what evidence could be introduced; it dealt
with what mitigating factors the defendant must be permitted to have considered
by the sentencing authority. 98 S. Ct. at 2966-67.
57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
58. This defect in the Ohio statute was not cured by the evidence being
presented in a two-step process. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Repl. Vol.
1975). Missouri has a similar two-step proceeding. V.A.M.S. § 565.012 (Supp.
1978). The Lockett decision indicates that the Court will look beyond the structure of the proceeding and scrutinize the availability of the opportunity for the
defendant to present, and the sentencer to consider, evidence of mitigating circumstances.
59. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
60. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2966 (1978).
61. Accord, Statev. Watson, No. 3089 (Az. 1978); Statev. Evans, No. 3721
(Az. 1978); State v. Steelman, No. 3299 (Az. 1978). Since the plurality's test
would encompass such a wide variety of factors for the sentencer to consider, it is
fair to assume that any "exclusive list" in order to meet the constitutional requirement of Lockett would do little more than advise the sentencing authority of factors it might consider.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10
62. V.A.M.S. § 565.006 (Supp. 1978).

63.

Id. § 565.012.
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would appear to be contrary to Lockett's directive that all factors pertaining to the defendant's character, record and the nature of the offense be
considered by the sentencer. However, the Missouri Supreme Court indicated in its newly published jury instructions that this is not the case. The
instructions specify that the jury may consider mitigating circumstances
other than those which are authorized by the statute or which exist at
law. 64 The Missouri Supreme Court appears to be distinguishing the exclusive language with regard to the statutory aggravating circumstances
from the lack of such language when the statute speaks of mitigating circumstances .

6

1

Even if the Missouri statute as interpreted by the state supreme court
does pass the plurality's test, Missouri may still need to react to the Lockett
pronouncement. It is at least questionable whether the rather ambiguous
language of the statute and the jury instructions will be sufficient to put
the jury as sentencer on notice that it is not limited to the statutory list of
mitigating circumstances. Perhaps the best solution to the problem would
be the addition of a new clause to the instruction, specifically authorizing
the sentencing authority to consider any aspect of the defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.
Whatever action the Missouri Supreme Court chooses, it seems clear
that the problems raised in Lockett will remain viable until the United
States Supreme Court explicitly resolves the perplexing issue of the propriety of capital punishment in today's society. One cannot avoid echoing
the fears of Justice Rehnquist that the plurality's opinion is, indeed, "the
third false start in this direction within the past six years." 66
MARCUS C. MCCARTY

64. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. CRIM. No. 15.44 (1978 ed.) (The instruction
reads in part: "it will then become your duty to determine whether a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances exist which outweigh such aggravating
circumstance or circumstances so found to exist. In deciding this question you
may consider all of the evidence relating to the murder of [name of victim]." Note
5 provides: "The jury may consider extenuating or mitigating circumstances...
even though not 'authorized by law'. .. . However, no instruction should be given
calling the jury's attention to [this].")
65. V.A.M.S. § 565.012 (Supp. 1978). This interpretation was implied by
the United States Supreme Court when it examined the Florida statute in Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250 n.8 (1976). Because Missouri's statute is virtually
identical to the Florida law in this passage, see notes 20 and 51 supra, it seems
logical
to assume
that the
Missouri
Supreme Repository,
Court has1979
also made this interpretaPublished
by University
of Missouri
School
of Law Scholarship
tion of the statute.
66. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2975 (1978).
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